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We compare three models of monetary exchange that diﬀer in terms of their
assumed market structures. In the ﬁrst, at least some activity takes place
in highly decentralized markets where anonymous buyers and sellers match
randomly and bargain bilaterally over the terms of trade. Following the
literature, we call this search equilibrium. In the second model there are
still frictions, and in particular agents are still anonymous, but they meet
in large markets where prices are taken as given. We call this competitive
equilibrium. In the third model, we assume there are diﬀerent submarkets
with posted prices and buyers and sellers can direct their search across these
submarkets, although within each submarket there are again frictions. We
call this competitive search equilibrium. In each case, we provide results on
existence and on uniqueness or multiplicity of equilibrium. We also analyze
eﬃciency and optimal monetary policy.
The underlying framework is related to recent search-theoretic models
of money following Lagos and Wright (2002) — hereafter referred to as LW.
The key assumption in this framework is that, in addition to the activity
that takes place in the more or less decentralized markets described above,
agents also have periodic access to centralized competitive markets. The
existence of the decentralized markets, and in particular the assumption that
agents are anonymous, generates an essential role for money (Kocherlakota
(1998), Wallace (2001)). The existence of the centralized markets greatly
simpliﬁes the analysis, because when combined with the assumption that
preferences are quasi-linear, it implies that all agents of a given type will
carry the same amount of money into the decentralized market. This renders
2the distribution of money holdings in this market simple, which makes the
model very easy to analyze, compared to similar models with no centralized
markets like Green and Zhou (1998), Molico (1999), Camera and Corbae
(1999), or Zhou (1999).2
Intuitively, the simpliﬁcation comes from the fact that quasi-linearity
eliminates wealth eﬀects on the demand for money, and hence eliminates
dispersion in money holdings based on trading histories. While we believe
that the wealth/distribution eﬀects from which we are abstracting are inter-
esting, as discussed in Levine (1991) and Molico (1999) e.g., the goal here
is to focus on other eﬀects that have not been analyzed previously.3 To
introduce these new eﬀects we extend existing monetary models by adding
a generalized matching technology and a free entry condition. These ex-
tensions can be thought of as being adapted from labor market models like
those discussed in Pissarides (2000). Their role here is to allow us to discuss
the eﬀects of inﬂation on the extensive margin (the number of trades) as well
as the intensive margin (the amount exchanged per trade), and to discuss
“search externalities” — i.e. the dependence of the amount of trade on the
composition of the market.
2Shi (1997) provides a diﬀerent approach that also delivers simple distributions; see LW
for a comparison. Note also that, as emphasized by Zhou (1999) and Kamiya and Shimizu
(2003), a problem with some of the models mentioned above is that they have a continuum
of stationary equilibria. This is not true in the LW model, even if we generalize preferences
away from quasi-linearity, for the following reason. In the models in Zhou or Kamiya and
Shimizu, there are equilibria where agents value money only in integer multiples of p;i . e .
the value of having m dollars, V (m),i sas t e pf u n c t i o nw i t hj u m p sa sa tp,2p,3p... Given
this, nothing actually pins down p.W i t hp e r i o d i cc o m p e t i t i v em a r k e t sa si nL W ,h o w e v e r ,
V (m) must be strictly increasing, and such equilibria do not arise.
3Moreover, although our speciﬁcation ignores wealth eﬀects, recent work suggests the
results are robust in the following sense. Khan, Thomas and Wright (2004) solve numer-
ically a version of the model in LW with a more general class of utility functions, and
show that as the wealth eﬀects get small, both the distribution of money holdings and
the welfare cost of inﬂation converge to the results derived analytically for quasi-linear
speciﬁcation.
3Our main result is to show that the diﬀerent market structures have
very diﬀerent implications for the nature of equilibrium and for the eﬀects
of policy. In search equilibrium (bargaining), we prove that the quantity
traded and entry are both ineﬃcient. In this model inﬂation implies a ﬁrst-
order welfare loss, and although the Friedman Rule is the optimal policy, it
cannot correct the ineﬃciencies on the intensive and extensive margins. In
competitive equilibrium (price taking), the Friedman Rule gives eﬃciency
along the intensive margin but not the extensive margin. In this model the
eﬀects of policy are ambiguous, and inﬂa t i o ni ne x c e s so ft h eF r i e d m a nR u l e
may be desirable. In competitive search equilibrium (posting), the Friedman
Rule achieves the ﬁrst best. In this model inﬂation reduces welfare but the
eﬀect is second order. We think these results are interesting because they
help to sort out which results in recent monetary theory are due to features
of the environment — preferences, information etc. — and which are due to
the assumed market structure — bargaining, posting etc.
The three market structures have previously been used, of course, in
diﬀerent contexts. In the context of monetary economics, dating back to
Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) most search-based models use
bargaining. Competitive pricing is used in, say, overlapping generations
models by Wallace (1980) and turnpike models by Townsend (1980), but
it has not been used in monetary models with search-type frictions. Price
posting and directed search have been used in several monetary models (see
Section 5 for references), but not in combination, and it is the combination
that is critical for the concept of competitive search equilibrium. In terms
of the literature on labor markets, one way to understand the three market
structures is the following. Our bargaining model is monetary economics’
4analog to the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search model; our price-
taking model is the analog to the Lucas and Prescott (1974) search model;
and our price-posting model with directed search is the analog to Moen
(1997) and Shimer (1996).
From a diﬀerent perspective, consider Diamond (1984), who introduced a
cash-in-advance constraint in the Diamond (1982) model because he wanted
to discuss “Money in Search Equilibrium.” Although his approach to bar-
gaining was primitive at best, perhaps a bigger problem was that money
is imposed exogenously via the cash-in-advance constraint. Later, Kiyotaki
and Wright (1991) showed that in a very similar environment a role for
money can be derived endogenously. Kocherlakota (1998) clariﬁed exactly
what makes money essential in those environments: a double coincidence
problem, imperfect enforcement, and anonymity. It seems natural to look
for a physical environment that incorporates these features, but also allows
one to consider alternative market structures. Here, in addition to being
able to discuss what Diamond wanted we can also analyze “Money in Com-
petitive Equilibrium” and “Money in Competitive Search Equilibrium.”
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
assumptions and discusses eﬃciency. Section 3-5 analyze equilibrium in the
models with bargaining, price taking, and price posting. Section 6 concludes
by summarizing the results.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
Time is discrete and continues forever. As in LW, each period is divided
into two subperiods, called day and night, where economic activity will dif-
fer. During the day there will be a frictionless centralized market, while at
5night there will be explicit frictions and trade will be more or less decentral-
ized, depending on which model (market structure) we consider. There is a
continuum of agents divided into two types that diﬀer in terms of when they
produce and consume. We ﬁnd it convenient to call them buyers and sellers.
The sets of buyers and sellers are denoted B and S, respectively. The diﬀer-
ence is the following: while all agents produce and consume during the day,
at night buyers want to consume but cannot produce while sellers are able
to produce but do not want to consume. This generates a temporal double
coincidence problem at night. Combined with the assumption that agents
are anonymous, which precludes credit in the decentralized night market,
this generates an essential role for money.4
It is well know by now that several diﬀerent models can generate a similar
role for money, including a variety of speciﬁcations with many goods and
specialization in tastes and technologies (e.g. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989,
1993)). We choose to work with a single consumption good and a temporal
double coincidence problem for the following reason. In the typical search-
based model, any agent engaged in decentralized trade may end up either
buying or selling, depending on who they meet, while here sellers can only
sell and buyers can only buy in the night market. Diﬀerentiating types ex
ante allows us to introduce an entry decision on one side of the decentralized
market, and thereby allows us to capture extensive margin eﬀects in a very
simple way. Thus, the measure of B is normalized to 1 and all buyers
participate in the night market at no cost, while only a subset St ⊆ S with
measure nt of sellers enter the night market at each date t,a n dw ew i l l
4Essential in this context means we can achieve allocations with money that we could
not achieve without it; again see Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace (2001).
6consider both the case where nt is exogenous and where sellers may or may
not choose to enter at cost k.5
Money in the model is perfectly divisible, and agents can hold any non-
negative amount. The quantity of money per buyer grows at constant rate
γ: Mt+1 = γMt. New money is injected, or withdrawn if γ<1, by lump-
sum transfers in the centralized market. For simplicity we assume these
transfers go only to buyers, but this is not essential for the results (i.e.,
things are basically the same if we also give transfers to sellers, as long as
they are lump sum in the sense that they do not depend on behavior, and in
particular, on their entry decisions). Also, we restrict attention to policies
where γ ≥ β,w h e r eβ i sad i s c o u n tr a t et ob ed i s c u s s e db e l o w ,s i n c ei tc a n
easily be checked that for γ<βthere is no equilibrium. Furthermore, when
γ = β — which is the Friedman Rule — we only consider equilibria obtained
by taking the limit γ → β.I n g e n e r a l , a t d a t e t the distribution of (real)
money holdings across buyers is Fb
t and the distribution across sellers is Fs
t .
The instantaneous utility of a buyer at date t is
Ub
t = v(xt) − yt + βdu(qt), (1)
where xt is the quantity consumed and yt the quantity produced during the
day, qt is consumption at night, and βd is a discount factor between day and
the night. There is also a discount factor between night and the next day,
5When we allow entry, we assume the set S is large enough that nt is never constrained.
Also, as in standard search models with constant returns, we are only interested in the
r a t i oo fb u y e r sa n ds e l l e r sa n dn o tt h eo v e r a l ls i z eo ft h em a r k e t ;t h i si sw h yw eh a v e
entry by one side only. There are alternatives to entry that can be used to endogenize
the extensive margin. For example, Rocheteau and Wright (2004) consider a ﬁxed total
number of agents that can choose whether to be buyers or sellers. In a related model
Lagos and Rocheteau (2003) keep the buyer-seller ratio ﬁxed but introduce endogenous
search intensity.




We assume u(0) = 0, u0(0) = ∞, u0(q) > 0,a n du00(q) < 0.A l s o ,v0(x) > 0,
v00(x) < 0 for all x, and there exists x∗ > 0 such that v0(x∗)=1 . Without
loss of generality, we normalize v(x∗)−x∗ =0 . Similarly, the instantaneous
utility of a seller is
Us
t = v(xt) − yt − βdc(qt), (2)
where xt is consumption and yt production during the day, and qt is pro-
duction at night. Lifetime utility for a seller is
P∞
t=0 βtUs
t .W e a s s u m e
c(0) = c0(0) = 0, c0(q) > 0 and c00(q) > 0.A l s ow ea s s u m ec(q)=u(q) for
some q>0,a n dl e tq∗ denote the solution to u0(q∗)=c0(q∗).
In the centralized day market the price of goods is normalized to 1 at each
date t, while the relative price of money is denoted φt. In the decentralized
night market, details in terms of prices will diﬀer across the models studied
below, but there will always be some friction in the following sense: each
period t only a subset e Bt ⊆ B of buyers and a subset e St ⊆ St ⊆ S of
sellers who participate get to trade in this market. Agents in e Bt ∪ e St may
either trade bilaterally or multilaterally in the models discussed below. The
measure of e Bt is αb(nt) and the measure of e St is ntαs(nt),a n dw ea s s u m e
agents in these sets are chosen at random; hence the probabilities of trading
for buyers and sellers at night are αb(nt) and αs(nt), respectively. This
allows for “search externalities” in the sense that trading probabilities may
depend on the ratio of sellers to buyers, nt. Typically, unless otherwise
indicated we assume αb(n)=α(n) and αs(n)=α(n)/n, which means the
6A special case is when agents do not discount between one subperiod and the next,
i.e. either βn =1or βd =1, as in LW. Another special case is when βd = βn, so that the
two subperiods can be thought of as even and odd dates, as in the version of the model
studied by Williamson (2004).
8same number of buyers and sellers trade in the decentralized market, but
w ea l s od i s c u s ss o m ec a s e sw h e r ew er e l a xt h i s .W ea l s oa s s u m eα0(n) > 0,
α00(n) < 0, α(n) ≤ min{1,n}, α(0) = 0, α0(0) = 1 and α(∞)=1 .7
We now consider eﬃciency, which of course can be discussed indepen-
dently of the assumed market structure and prices. Consider a social planner
who chooses each period the measure nt of sellers in the night market, as
well as an allocation At =[ qb
t(i),qs
t(i),x t(i),y t(i)] specifying consumption
and production during the day [xt(i),y t(i)] for all i ∈ B ∪ S, consumption
at night qb
t(i) for all i ∈ e Bt, and production at night qs
t(i) for all i ∈ e St.T h e
planner is constrained by the frictions in the environment, in the sense that
he cannot actually choose e Bt and e St, but only nt, and then these sets are
determined at random in such a way that e Bt has measure αb(nt) and e St has
measure ntαs(nt). In the case where the same number of buyers and sellers
trade in the decentralized market, e Bt and e St both have measure α(nt).
Given quasi-linear utility, we only consider the case where the planner













t(i)]di − βdknt. (3)
The planner wants to maximize
P∞
t=0 βtWt. Feasibility requires several











t(i)di, but in addition, in a model where
7The function α(n) can be given several interpretations; for now one can think of it as
the standard speciﬁcation coming from a constant returns to scale matching technology.
Thus, if µ(nb,n s) is the number of meetings when there are nb buyers and ns sellers,
constant returns implies the arrival rate for a representative buyer is αb = µ(nb,n s)/nb =
α(ns/nb). See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for an extensive discussion of the matching
function.
9agents trade bilaterally at night, we have the stronger requirement qb
t(i) ≤
qs
t(j) for each trading pair (i,j).A n eﬃcient outcome is deﬁned as paths
for nt and At that maximize
P∞
t=0 βtWt subject to these restrictions.
PROPOSITION 1: An eﬃcient outcome is stationary and satisﬁes: x(i)=
x∗ for all agents in the day market; qb(i)=qb and qs(i)=qs for all i ∈ e B







s(n)][qsc0(qs) − c(qs)] = k. (4)
In the case where αb(n)=nαs(n)=α(n), this implies qb(i)=qs(j)=q∗
and n = n∗,w h e r e
α0(n∗)[u(q∗) − c(q∗)] = k. (5)
PROOF: Note ﬁrst that the planner’s problem is equivalent to a sequence
of static problems. Maximizing Wt at each date leads to ﬁrst order condi-
tions that imply v0[x(i)] = 1, and therefore x(i)=x∗ for all i in the day
market, and u0[qb(i)] = c0[qs(j)] = λ/βd for all i and j that trade in the night
market where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility con-
straint
R
h B qb(i)di =
R
h S qs(i)di. From the feasibility constraint, since e B and e S
have measures αb(n) and nαs(n), respectively, we have αb(n)qb = nαs(n)qs.
Given this, the ﬁrst order condition for n is (4). Finally, (5) is derived from
(4) by using qs = qb and αs(n)+nα0
s(n)=α0(n). Q.E.D.
As long as x = x∗,w h i c hw i l lt u r no u tt ob et r u ei ne v e r ye q u i l i b r i u m
considered below, and ignoring constants, for any n and q welfare per period
can be measured by α(n)[u(q) − c(q)] − kn. F r o mt h i si ti sc l e a rt h a tt h e
eﬃcient q is the one that solves u0(q∗)=c0(q∗), and as seen in (5) the eﬃcient
n is the one that makes a seller’s marginal contribution to the trading process
α0(n) times the surplus u(q∗) − c(q∗) equal to the participation cost k.
103. SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM (BARGAINING)
In this section we study the market structure used in much of the recent
literature on the microfoundations of money, where buyers and sellers trade
bilaterally and bargain over the terms of trade. In this model, one can think
of the event that a buyer gets to trade as the event that he meets as e l l e r ,
and vice-versa, as in standard matching models. In the following we deﬁne
the real value of an amount of money mt in the hands of an agent at date
t by zt = φtmt. Here we focus on steady-state equilibria, where aggregate
real variables, including the aggregate real money supply Zt = φtMt,a r e
constant. Therefore, in steady-state equilibrium, we have φt+1/φt =1 /γ
because Mt+1/Mt = γ.
If a buyer with real balances zb meets a seller with zs,l e td = d(zb,z s)
and q = q(zb,z s) denote the real dollars and units of the good that are
traded. Let V b(zb) and Wb(zb) be the value functions for a buyer with zb in
the night market and day market, respectively, and let V s(zs) and Ws(zs)
be the value functions for sellers. Bellman’s equation for a buyer in the
decentralized night market is
V b(zb)=α(n)
Z ½
u[q(zb,z s)] + βnWb
·










In words, with probability α(n) he meets a seller who has a random zs,a t
which point he consumes q(zb,z s) and starts the next day with real balances
[zb − d(zb,z s)]/γ; and with probability 1−α(n) he does not trade and starts





−c[q(zb,z s)] + βnWs
·
















Comparing (6) and (7), notice only sellers pay the participation cost k.




v(x) − y + βdV b(ˆ z)
o
(8)
subject to ˆ z + x = zb + T + y, (9)
where T is his real transfer and ˆ z is the real balances he takes into that




{v(x) − y + βdV s(ˆ z)} (10)
subject to ˆ z + x = zs + y. (11)
LEMMA 1: For all agents in the centralized market, ˆ z is independent of
z.A l s o ,Wb(zb)=zb + Wb(0) and Ws(zs)=zs + Ws(0) are linear.
PROOF: Consider a buyer. Substituting (9) into (8), we have
Wb(zb)=zb + T +m a x
ˆ z,x
n
v(x) − x − ˆ z + βdV b(ˆ z)
o
. (12)
The rest is obvious. Q.E.D.
8If a buyer holds zt = mtφt at the end of period t, his real balances at the beginning
of period t +1are zt+1 = mtφt+1 = ztφt+1/φt = zt/γ.
9We are ignoring non-negativity constraints. For variables other than y,t h e s ew i l lb e
satisﬁed under the usual conditions. For y, we simply look for equilibria with the property
that y>0 for all agents, but one can impose conditions on primitives to guarantee this is
valid, as in LW. It is important that y ≥ 0 is not binding for a key result proved below —
the result that all agents of a given type choose the same ˆ z, independent of z.
12Assuming V b is diﬀerentiable (it will be) the ﬁrst order condition for ˆ z
from (12) is
−1+βdV b
z (ˆ z) ≤ 0, =0if ˆ z>0, (13)
and if V b is strictly concave over the relevant range (it will be under weak
conditions) there is a unique solution to (13) and all buyers choose the same
ˆ z.10 Similarly all sellers choose the same ˆ z. To say more, we need to discuss
the terms of trade in the decentralized market.
Consider a meeting between a buyer with zb and a seller with zs at night.
To determine q(zb,z s) and d(zb,z s) in this model we use the generalized Nash
bargaining solution, where θ ∈ (0,1] is the bargaining power of a buyer and
threat points are given by continuation values. Thus, the payoﬀs of the buyer
and seller are u(q)+βnWb [(zb − d)/γ] and −c(q)+βnWs [(zs + d)/γ],a n d
the threat points are βnWb(zb/γ) and βnWs(zs/γ).L i n e a r i t yo fWb(zb) and
Ws(zs) implies Wb [(zb − d)/γ] − Wb [zb/γ]=−d/γ and Ws [(zs + d)/γ] −
















where d is subject to the resource constraint d ≤ zb.
It is immediate that the solution to (14) is independent of zs.M o r e o v e r ,
(q,d) depends on zb if and only if the constraint d ≤ zb binds. If it does not




d =( 1 − θ)u(q)+θc(q) (16)
10LW provide details on the existence, diﬀerentiability, and strict concavity of the value
functions for their version of the model, and the same arguments apply here. We will
discuss how things change in the other models considered below.
13which imply q = q∗ and d = z∗ =[ θc(q∗)+( 1− θ)u(q∗)]γ/βn.I f t h e
constraint does bind, then q solves the ﬁrst order condition from (14) with







For future reference, note that the function g(q,θ) deﬁn e di n( 1 7 )s a t i s ﬁes
gq(q,θ) > 0 for all q<q ∗.
This fully describes decentralized trade under bargaining. To return to
the determination of ˆ z, we now make the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 1: (i) limq→0 u0(q)/gq(q,θ)=∞; (ii) for all q<q ∗,
u0(q)/gq(q,θ) is strictly decreasing.
Part (i) is a standard Inada condition. Part (ii) implies equilibrium will
be unique when n is exogenous, and is made so that we will know any
multiplicity of equilibria that occurs when n is endogenous is due to free
entry.11 We have the following.
LEMMA 2: Sellers set ˆ z =0 .B u y e r s s e tˆ z = γg(q,θ)/βn,w h e r eg is







PROOF: Consider ﬁrst sellers. From the bargaining solution, ∂q/∂zs =
∂d/∂zs =0for all zs.H e n c e ,t h eﬁrst order condition for ˆ z for a seller is
−1+βdV s
z = −1+β/γ ≤ 0, =0if ˆ z>0.
11LW establish that a suﬃcient condition for (ii) is that either θ is not too small or u
0
is log-concave and c is linear. Some such condition is required because under bargaining
q is generally a nonlinear function of zb and it depends on u
000. As we will see, this is not
a problem in the models in the later sections.
14Since as we said above we only consider either the case γ>β ,o rt h ec a s e
γ = β but equilibrium is the limit as γ → β from above, the solution is
ˆ z =0 .
Now consider buyers. From (15)-(17), if zb >z ∗ then ∂q/∂zb = ∂d/∂zb =
0,a n di fzb <z ∗ then ∂q/∂zb = βn/γgq(q,θ) and ∂d/∂zb =1 .F r o m( 6 ) ,i f
zb >z ∗ then V b















Given γ>β , −ˆ z + βdV b(ˆ z) is strictly decreasing for all ˆ z>z ∗.A l s o ,o n e
can show that as z → z∗ from below, we have limu0[q(z)]/gq[q(z),θ] ≤ 1.
This establishes that as z → z∗ from below −1+βdV b
z (z) < 0,a n ds ot h e
optimizing choice is ˆ z<z ∗. Inserting (19) into the ﬁrst order condition
1=βdV b
z (ˆ z) and rearranging we get (18). Assumption 1 guarantees that it
has a unique positive solution. Q.E.D.
Having discussed z and q we now move to n. We consider two alterna-
tives: either it is exogenous at n =¯ n, or it is endogenous and determined
by free entry.










PROOF: First note that a seller who does not enter gets a payoﬀ each
day of v(x∗)−x∗ =0 . Since sellers do not bring money to the decentralized
market, Ws(z)=z + βd max[V s(0),0] = z. Free entry implies 0=V s(0) =
α(n)
n {−c[q(zb,0)] + βnd(zb,0)/γ} − k, which reduces to (20). Q.E.D.
By (20), the participation cost is equal to the probability of trading





[u(q) − c(q)] = k. (21)
As a necessary condition for n>0 we impose
ASSUMPTION 2: k<
(1 − θ)c0(˜ q)
θu0(˜ q)+( 1− θ)c0(˜ q)
[u(˜ q) − c(˜ q)],
where ˜ q is the solution to (18) when γ = β;n o t i c et h a t˜ q = q∗ if θ =1while
˜ q<q ∗ otherwise. Given k>0, naturally Assumption 2 requires θ<1.
We now deﬁne equilibrium formally for this model. In all deﬁnitions
in this paper, when we say equilibrium we mean a steady-state monetary
equilibrium with q,n > 0.12
DEFINITION 1: (i) With n =¯ n, search equilibrium is a list (q,z) ∈ R2
+
satisfying (17) and (18). (ii) With free entry, search equilibrium is a list
(q,z,n) ∈ R3
+ satisfying (17), (18) and (21).
Note that equilibrium has a recursive structure: with n ﬁxed q is determined
by (18), and with free entry (q,n) is determined by (18) and (21), but in
either case we can solve for z = γg(q,θ)/βn after we ﬁnd q. Hence, we
concentrate on q and n in what follows.
PROPOSITION 2: (i) Assume n =¯ n. Search equilibrium exists and
is unique. Furthermore, ∂q/∂γ < 0. (ii) Assume free-entry. There is a
¯ γ>βsuch that equilibrium exists if and only if γ ≤ ¯ γ. For all γ ∈ (β,¯ γ)
equilibrium is generically not unique. At the equilibrium with the highest q,
∂q/∂γ < 0 and ∂n/∂γ < 0.W h e nγ = β there exists a unique equilibrium.
PROOF: (i) If n =¯ n then equilibrium is simply a q>0 solving (18),
which exists uniquely by Assumption 1. It is easy to check ∂q/∂γ < 0.
12Nonstationary equilibria for a version of the model with n ﬁxed are analyzed in Lagos
and Wright (2003).
16(ii) Now consider free entry. Let ¯ q be the value of q that solves (21)
when n =0 , and notice n>0 i fa n do n l yi fq>¯ q. A necessary condition for
equilibrium to exist is ¯ q<˜ q which holds by Assumption 2. For all q ∈ [¯ q, ˜ q],
(21) can be written n = n(q) with n0(q)=α(n)[gq(q,θ)−c0(q)]/k[1−η(n)] >







− (γ − β).
From Deﬁnition 1, an equilibrium exists if and only if there is a q ∈ (¯ q, ˜ q]
such that Γ(q;γ)=0 .
Consider ﬁrst the limiting case γ = β. Then the unique q ∈ (¯ q, ˜ q] such
that Γ(q;β)=0is q =˜ q.C o n s i d e rn e x tγ>β .T h e nΓ(¯ q;γ)=Γ(˜ q;γ)=
β − γ<0.A s Γ(q;γ) is continuous, if equilibrium exists it is generically
not unique. Furthermore, Γ(q;γ) is decreasing in γ, Γ(q;β) > 0 for all
q ∈ (¯ q, ˜ q), and for large values of γ, Γ(q;γ) < 0 for all q ∈ (¯ q, ˜ q].T h e r e f o r e ,
there is a ¯ γ>βsuch that equilibrium exists if and only if γ ≤ ¯ γ.F i n a l l y ,
∂q/∂γ =1 /Γq and Γq < 0 at the equilibrium with the highest q,w h i c h
means ∂q/∂γ < 0, and, from (21), ∂n/∂γ < 0. Q.E.D.
I nt h ec a s ew i t hn endogenous, equilibrium obtains at the intersection of
two curves in (n,q) space, the q-curve deﬁned by (18) and the n-curve deﬁned
by (21). See Figure 1. Both curves are upward-sloping, and as γ increases
the q-curve rotates downward. For γ>β ,a tb o t hn =0and n = n(˜ q)
the n-curve is above the q-curve, so equilibria are generically not unique.
It is clear that this multiplicity requires a participation decision since when
n is exogenous Assumption 1 guarantees uniqueness, but note that it does
not require increasing returns, as in the typical nonmonetary search model.
The reason is that there is a strategic interaction here between entry by
17sellers and money demand by buyers.13 However, in the limit as γ → β the
q-curve becomes horizontal at ˜ q for all n>0, and we get uniqueness as the
equilibrium with low (q,n) coalesces with the origin.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
We now analyze eﬃciency and the eﬀects of inﬂation.
PROPOSITION 3: (i) Assume n =¯ n. The optimal monetary policy is
γ = β and it yields the eﬃcient outcome if and only if θ =1 .( i i )A s s u m e
free entry. Equilibria with higher q and n yield higher W.I n t h e b e s t
equilibrium, the optimal monetary policy is γ = β, but it can never achieve
the eﬃcient outcome.
PROOF: With n =¯ n, W = βdα(¯ n)[u(q) − c(q)] is maximized at q = q∗.
From (18), q = q∗ if and only if γ = β and θ =1 . Under free en-
try α(n)[g(q,θ) − c(q)] = nk and W = βdα(n)[u(q) − c(q)] − βdnk =
βdα(n)[u(q) − g(q,θ)].S i n c e α(n) is increasing in n and u(q) − g(q,θ) is
increasing in q for all q ∈ [0, ˜ q], equilibria with higher q and n imply higher
W.S i n c e∂q/∂γ < 0 and ∂n/∂γ < 0 a tt h eb e s te q u i l i b r i u m ,∂W/∂γ < 0,
and the best policy is γ = β.A tγ = β,w eh a v eq = q∗ if and only if θ =1 .
But θ =1implies n =0 , so there is no way to achieve q = q∗ and n>0.
Q.E.D.
For all θ<1 and all γ, q is too low due to a holdup problem that reduces
the demand for money: when a buyer brings cash to the decentralized market
he is making an investment, but when θ<1 he is not getting the full return
on his investment. This reduces the equilibrium value of q below the eﬃcient
13A similar point has been made by Johri (1999), who shows that a version of Diamond
(1982) with constant returns can have multiple equilibria once money is introduced in a
sensible way.
18level. Consider Figure 2, which plots the total surplus from decentralized




[u(q) − c(q)], (22)
as functions of q.14 The curve Sb(q) reaches a maximum at q =˜ q ≤ q∗,w i t h
the inequality strict if θ<1. A buyer will never bring more money than
needed to buy the quantity that maximizes Sb(q). If there is an opportunity
cost of holding money, which there is when γ>β ,h ew i l li nf a c tp r e f e rt o
buy less than ˜ q.H e n c e ,w eh a v eq<q ∗ whenever γ>β .
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
In the case where n is endogenous, inﬂation aﬀects both individual real
balances and the frequency of trade. Comparison of (5) and (21) implies




where η(n)=nα0(n)/α(n) measures sellers’ contribution to buyers’ proba-
bility of trade. This is the familiar Hosios (1990) condition: entry is eﬃcient
if and only if agents’ share of the surplus from trade equals η (n).I ti sp o s -
sible for n to be either too high or too low in equilibrium, and if it is too
high, inﬂation actually increases welfare along the extensive margin (basi-
cally, by driving out some sellers). Still, the negative eﬀect on the intensive
margin always dominates any positive eﬀect on the extensive margin. We
will discuss this further in the next section.
14To derive(22), insert βnz/γ = g(q,θ) from (17) into S
b(q)=u(q)−βnz/γ and simplify.
The seller’s share is deﬁned similarly.
194. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM (PRICE TAKING)
Considering a competitive market at night, with a Walrasian auction-
eer, may make the decentralized market less decentralized but it does not
make money inessential as long as we maintain the double coincidence prob-
lem and anonymity (Levine (1991) and Temzelides and Yu (2003) make a
similar point). Also, we can still capture search-type frictions by assuming
that, although there is a competitive market at night, not all agents get in.
Following the notation in the previous section, the probabilities of getting
an opportunity to trade — which now means getting into the market — for
buyers and sellers are αb(n) and αs(n).15 Note that entry by sellers in this
model means entry into the group S trying to get into the night market; of
these only e S ⊆ S succeed. For those who do, after seeing the (real) price of
night goods p, each buyer chooses demand qb and each seller chooses supply
qs. Goods trade against money for exactly the same reason they did in the
previous section: the double coincidence problem and anonymity.16















where the maximization is subject to the budget constraint pqb ≤ zb,a n d
Wb(zb) still satisﬁes (8) from the previous section. Similarly, for sellers, we
15Since competitive equilibrium does not require bilateral trade, for now we adopt a
general speciﬁcation for αb(n) and αs(n); later, we will specialize to αb(n)=nαs(n)=
α(n) in order to make the diﬀerent models comparable.
16The assumption that not all agents get into the night market is simply a convenient
way to introduce search-type frictions into an otherwise Walrasian model; it can be thought
















where Ws(zs) is the same as in the previous section.












PROOF: For sellers, the reasoning is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.















where z∗ satisﬁes u0 (z∗/p)=βnp/γ. To establish the concavity of V b(z),
note that V b
zz = αbu00/(p)
2 < 0 for all z<z ∗, V b
zz =0for all z>z ∗,a n d
V b
z (z) is continuous at z∗. Furthermore, −1+βdV b
z (z) is strictly decreasing
in z for all z ∈ [0,z∗], −1+βdV b
z (0) = ∞ and −1+βdV b
z (z)=−1+β/γ
for all z ≥ z∗. Consequently, for all γ>βthere is a unique z ∈ (0,z∗)
satisfying 1=βdV b




From Lemma 4, each of the αb(n) buyers who get in to the market at
night demand qb. Similarly, each of the nαs(n) sellers who get in supply qs.
To clear the market we require
nαs(n)qs = αb(n)qb. (27)
From (25) c0(qs)=βnp/γ,w h i c hw i t hqb = z/p implies
βn
γ








If n is endogenous, the free entry condition is analogous to (20) where βnd/γ
is replaced by βnpqs/γ = c0(qs)qs,
αs(n)
£
qsc0 (qs) − c(qs)
¤
= k. (30)
DEFINITION 2: (i) With n =¯ n,acompetitive equilibrium is a list
(qb,qs,z) ∈ R3
+ satisfying (27), (28) and (29). (ii) With free entry, a com-
petitive equilibrium is a list (qb,qs,z,n) ∈ R4
+ satisfying (27), (28), (29) and
(30).
As we said above, we do not necessarily assume that the same number
of buyers and sellers get into the night market. However, if we do make this
assumption then one can imagine exchange being bilateral in this model, as
it is in the other models we discuss, even though prices are determined in a
competitive market. This assumption means αb(n)=nαs(n)=α(n),a n d
then the market clearing condition (27) is simply qb = qs = q,w h e r eq is
given by (29). This makes it easier to compare the diﬀerent models, since,
e.g., (29) is analogous to (18) in the previous section (indeed they coincide
if and only if θ =1 ). Also, note that things are again recursive: we can ﬁrst
determine q and then z = γqc0(q)/βn.
DEFINITION 2’: Consider the special case where αb(n)=nαs(n)=
α(n), and therefore qb = qs = q.( i )W i t hn =¯ n,acompetitive equilibrium is
al i s t(q,z) ∈ R2
+ satisfying (28) and (29). (ii) With free entry, a competitive
equilibrium is a list (q,z,n) ∈ R3
+ satisfying (28), (29) and (30).
The following restriction is necessary for n>0.
ASSUMPTION 2’: k<q ∗c0(q∗) − c(q∗).
22PROPOSITION 4: (i) Assume n =¯ n. Competitive equilibrium exists
and is unique. Furthermore, ∂q/∂γ < 0. (ii) Assume free-entry. There exists
¯ γ>βsuch that equilibrium exists if and only if γ ≤ ¯ γ. For all γ ∈ (β,¯ γ)
equilibrium is generically not unique. At the equilibrium with the highest q,
∂q/∂γ < 0 and ∂n/∂γ < 0.W h e nγ = β there exists a unique equilibrium.
PROOF: The argument is essentially the same as the proof of Proposition
2 and therefore is omitted. Q.E.D.
Let nβ denote the equilibrium value of n at γ = β;s i n c eγ = β implies
q = q∗, this means nβ solves α(nβ)[q∗c0 (q∗) − c(q∗)] = nβk.
PROPOSITION 5: (i) Assume n =¯ n. The optimal policy is γ = β
and it yields the eﬃcient outcome. (ii) Assume free-entry. Equilibrium is





In the equilibrium with highest q and n, optimal policy involves γ>βif
and only if η(nβ) <
q∗c0(q∗)−c(q∗)
u(q∗)−c(q∗) .
PROOF: From (29) we have q = q∗ i fa n do n l yi fγ = β. Comparing
(30) with (5), we see that nβ = n∗ if and only if (31) holds. Diﬀerentiating





















β [u00(q∗) − c00(q∗)][1 − η(nβ)]k
< 0.
As long as η(nβ) <
q∗c0(q∗)−c(q∗)
u(q∗)−c(q∗) ,w eh a v edW/dγ > 0. Q.E.D.
23If n =¯ n the Friedman Rule γ = β yields full eﬃciency. This is in
accordance with many models in monetary economics, although not the one
in the previous section, where the Friedman Rule was the optimal policy
but could not achieve full eﬃciency unless θ =1 .T h er e a s o nγ = β implies
eﬃciency here is that the holdup problem with money demand disappears
under competitive pricing. If n is endogenous, in addition to γ = β,f o r
eﬃciency we also need (31) to be satisﬁed. Hence, full eﬃciency is achieved
if and only if the Friedman Rule and the Hosios condition both hold. There
is no reason to expect the Hosios condition to hold, in general, since (31)
relates the elasticity of the matching function to properties of preferences.
Therefore n is typically ineﬃcient, and may be either too high or too low. In
particular, when the number of sellers in the economy is too high at γ = β,
a deviation from the Friedman rule is welfare improving.
It is uncommon for a deviation from the Friedman Rule to be optimal.
The intuition for our result is as follows. In general, when sellers decide
to enter they impose, in the jargon of the literature, a “congestion” eﬀect
on other sellers and a “thick market” eﬀect on buyers. If the former eﬀect
dominates — and it certainly will for some speciﬁcations — then n is too high,
and inﬂation helps because it reduces sellers’ incentive to enter. Inﬂation
also reduces q, and this hurts along the intensive margin, but it has only
a second-order eﬀect in the neighborhood of the Friedman rule since q is
close to q∗ in the neighborhood of the Friedman rule. It is important to
emphasize that this result is diﬀerent from the bargaining model, where in
general q<q ∗ for θ 6=1 , and hence the negative eﬀect of inﬂation along the
intensive margin has a ﬁrst order eﬀect.17
17There are a few related results in the literature based on “search externalities,” in-
24It may not be surprising that a single policy instrument γ cannot sort
out both the intensive and the extensive margins. If taxes and transfers were
available that could be made contingent on agents’ types and actions, say,
one could presumably do better in trying to correct for ineﬃcient entry by
sellers. When such transfers cannot be implemented, however, inﬂation is a
natural instrument to target “congestion” since it reduces agents’ incentives
to participate in the market. We have shown that one cannot necessarily
choose γ to get eﬃciency on both margins. One should not be too cavalier,
however, about thinking that it is unsurprising that a single instrument
cannot achieve eﬃciency on both margins — in the model of the next section,
it turns out that it can.18
5. COMPETITIVE SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM (POSTING)
The concept of competitive search equilibrium is based on the idea that
some agents can post a price (or, more generally, a contract) that speciﬁes
the terms at which buyers and sellers commit to trade. Buyers and sellers
in the market observe posted prices and choose where to go, although again
there may be frictions. In some versions, frictions manifest themselves by
cluding Li (1995) and Berentsen, Rocheteau and Shi (2001), but those results are not
especially robust. In general, even with “search externalities” it is often the case that the
Friedman Rule is optimal — this was certainly true in the previous section. It seems that
one has to somehow get around the holdup problem for the potentially desirable extensive
margin eﬀects to dominate the bad intensive margin eﬀects. Li assumes indivisible goods
and indivisible money, which certainly does the trick, and Berentsen et al. invoke a special
b a r g a i n i n gs o l u t i o n .H e r ew ea v o i dt h eh o l d u pp r o b l e mb e c a u s ew eh a v ec o m p e t i t i v ep r i c e
taking.
18We close this section by mentioning that the welfare results are robust if we relax the
assumption that equal numbers of buyers and sellers get into the night market, and indeed
it is even easier to construct examples. Assume, for instance, that all buyers get in with
probability one while sellers get in with probability αs(n) where α
0
s(n) < 0. Then (4) and
(30) imply that n is necessarily too high at γ = β,a n di n ﬂa t i o na b o v et h eF r i e d m a nr u l e
necessarily improves welfare, by reducing n.
25more or fewer buyers showing up at a seller’s location that he has capacity
to serve (Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001)), while in other versions agents get
t oc h o o s eal o c a t i o nw i t hag i v e np r i c eb u ts t i l lh a v et os e a r c hf o rt r a d i n g
partners at that location (Moen (1997)). In either case, there is (partially)
directed search, and this generates competition among price setters.19
We adopt the interpretation of competitive search equilibrium that as-
sumes there are agents called market makers who can open submarkets
where they post the terms of trade (q,d).20 Agents can direct their search
in the sense that they can go to any submarket they like, but within any
submarket there is random bilateral matching. Given knowledge of (q,d)
across submarkets, and expectations about where other agents go, which
determines the arrival rates across submarkets, each buyer or seller decides
where to go, and in equilibrium expectations must be rational. When de-
signing a submarket, a market maker takes into account the relationship
between the posted (q,d) and the numbers of buyers and sellers who show
up, summarized by the ratio n. In equilibrium the set of submarkets is
complete in the sense that there is no submarket that could be opened that
makes some buyers and sellers better oﬀ.
The timing of events in a period is as follows. At the beginning of
each day, market makers announce the submarkets to be open that night,
19Corbae, Temzelides and Wright (2003) show that directed search models still have an
essential role for money, but do not consider price posting, and the notion of competitive
search equilibrium requires the combination of the two. For monetary models with posting
and undirected search, see the references in Curtis and Wright (2004).
20One can think of market makers as proﬁt-maximizing agents who charge submarket
participants an entry fee, which we assume must be independent of agents’ types; this
fee will be 0 in equilibrium because the cost of opening a submarket is negligible. See
Mortensen and Wright (2002). One can also interpret the model as having buyers or
sellers themselves post (q,d) in order to maximize their expected utility. See Faig and
Huangfu (2004) for a recent discussion and some extensions.
26as described by (q,d), and this implies an expected n in each submarket.
Agents then trade in the centralized market during the day and readjust
their real balances, exactly as before, and go to submarkets of their choosing
at night in a way consistent with expectations. In the submarkets at night
agents trade goods and money bilaterally, like in search equilibrium, except
they do not bargain — they are bound by the posted terms of trade (q,d).
Obviously, this builds in a certain amount of commitment; this is a deﬁning
feature of the competitive search equilibrium concept. We let Ω denote the
set of open submarkets, with generic element ω =( q,d,n) listing the terms
of trade and the seller-buyer ratio.
For a buyer at night,
















where 1(zb ≥ d) is the indicator function that is equal to one if zb ≥ d and
zero otherwise. Thus, a buyer chooses ω among the set of open submarkets,
and then he gets to trade if he meets a seller and has enough money to meet
the posted price, zb ≥ d.F o ras e l l e ra tn i g h t ,























The functions Wb and Ws are exactly as in the previous sections.
As before, the seller’s choice of real balances in the day market is ˆ z =0 .
The set of open submarkets is complete if there is no submarket that could
beat existing submarkets, in the sense of making some buyers better oﬀ
27without making sellers worse oﬀ (it would obviously be equivalent to consider
the dual). A submarket with a posted (q,d) will attract a measure n of sellers










if −c(q)+βnd/γ ≥ J,a n dn =0otherwise, where J is the equilibrium
expected utility of a seller at night. This constraint says that sellers will
only show up if they get the J prevailing in the market; if −c(q)+βnd/γ ≥ J
then n will adjust to bring (35) into equality and if −c(q)+βnd/γ < J then
sellers would not show up even if they could trade with probability 1.
Completeness means market makers choose (q,d,n) to maximize Wb(zb)
subject to the constraint in (35). From (8) and (33), it is easy to check that
d =ˆ z (i.e. the buyer will bring in just enough money to meet the posted d




















subject to the same constraint. Ignoring constants in the objective function,





















subject to the same constraint. Letting N(J) denote the set of solutions for
n, we have the following results.
LEMMA 5: N(J) is non-empty and upper hemi-continuous, and any
selection from N(J) is decreasing in J. For all n ∈ N(J) such that n>0,







28PROOF: The objective function in (37) is continuous and, with no loss
in generality, (q,z,α) can be restricted to the compact set
∆ = {(q,z,α):α ∈ [0,1],q∈ [0,q∗],c(q) ≤ βnz/γ ≤ u(q)}.
Given this, the constraint (35) can be rewritten as (q,z,α) ∈ Γ(J) where
Γ(J) is a continuous and compact-valued correspondence. By virtue of the
Theorem of the Maximum, the correspondence that gives the set of solutions
for α is non-empty and upper hemi-continuous. Since α(n) is a bijection,
N(J) is non-empty and upper hemi-continuous.
We now show that any selection from N(J) is decreasing in J.C o n s i d e r
J1 >J 0 > 0 and denote by (qi,z i,n i) a solution to (37) when J = Ji,
for i =0 ,1. First, it is easy to check that if n0 =0then n1 =0 .N o w
consider the case where a solution to (37) is interior, n>0. Substituting
βnz/γ = Jn/α(n)+c(q) from the constraint into (37), write the problem as
max(n,q) Ψ(n,q;J) where











































Since n/α(n) is strictly increasing in n,t h i si m p l i e sn1 ≤ n0.T os h o w
the inequality is strict, take the ﬁrst-order conditions for q and n.T h e s e
imply (38) and








29From (38), if n1 = n0 then q1 = q0, which is inconsistent with (41). Q.E.D.
We are ready to formally deﬁne competitive search equilibrium. This
deﬁnition is slightly more involved than the ones in the previous sections
because there may be multiple submarkets open in equilibrium and we have
to keep track of where (to which submarket) agents go. The measure of
buyers on a given submarket ω is denoted b. Also, we restrict our attention
to equilibria where the set of open submarkets is countable.
DEFINITION 3: A competitive search equilibrium is a set of open sub-
markets Ω,f o re a c hω ∈ Ω al i s t(qω,z ω,n ω,b ω) ∈ R4
+,a n daJ ≥ 0 such
that: (a) given J, for all ω ∈ Ω, (qω,z ω,n ω) maximizes (37) subject to the
constraint that (35) holds if nω > 0;( b )
P
ω bω =1 ;a n di fn =¯ n then (c1)
P
ω bωnω =¯ n, or if we have free entry then (c2) J = k.
As in the previous models, we need some restriction on k to have n>0.
ASSUMPTION 2”: k<u (q∗) − c(q∗).
N o ww eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t s .
PROPOSITION 6: (i) Assume n =¯ n. Competitive search equilibrium
exists and J is uniquely determined. (ii) Assume free-entry. There is a
¯ γ>βsuch that equilibrium exists if and only if γ ≤ ¯ γ. For all γ ∈ [β,¯ γ]
equilibrium is generically unique.
PROOF: (i) Let ˜ N(J) denote the convex hull of N(J). The equilibrium
conditions
P
ω∈Ω bωnω =¯ n and
P
ω∈Ω bω =1 ,w h e r enω ∈ N(J) for all ω,
imply ¯ n ∈ ˜ N(J).W en o wd e s c r i b e˜ N(J) in detail, and depict it in Figure
3. If J =0then the market maker’s problem becomes max(q,n){α(n)[u(q)−
c(q)]−(γ −β)c(q)/β} which implies ˜ N(0) = {∞}.I fJ>u (q∗)−c(q∗) then
there is no n>0 that satisﬁes (41) and therefore ˜ N(J)={0}.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
it can be checked that ˜ N(J) is convex-valued and upper hemi-continuous.
30By virtue of Lemma 5 any selection from ˜ N(J) is strictly decreasing in J
for all n>0. Therefore, there exists a unique J ≤ [u(q∗) − c(q∗)] such that
¯ n ∈ ˜ N(J).
(ii) Let V(k,γ) denote the value function deﬁned by (37). For all γ ≥ β
such that V(k,γ) > 0, the solution to (37) is such that n>0 and equi-
librium exists. From the Theorem of the Maximum, V(k,γ) is continu-
ous. Furthermore, it can easily be checked that V(k,γ) is decreasing in
γ, and strictly decreasing when n>0. From Assumption 2”, V(k,β)=
max(q,n) {α(n)[u(q) − c(q)] − nk} > 0. From (35), βnz/γ ≥ k,w h i c hi m -
plies that there is no interior solution to (37) for large enough values of γ.
Consequently, there exists a threshold ¯ γ>βsuch that equilibrium exists if
a n do n l yi fγ ∈ [β,¯ γ]. Finally, given that α(n) is in the compact set [0,1]
and strictly decreasing with J, there is at most a countable number of values
for J such that ˜ N(J) is not a singleton. Q.E.D.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The curve ˜ N(J) in Figure 3 can be interpreted as aggregate demand
for sellers by market makers; it is the convex hull of the correspondence
giving the value(s) of n solving the market maker’s problem taking as given
the price of sellers, J. It is downward sloping as the demand for sellers
decreases with J. Without entry, J adjusts so that ˜ N(J)=¯ n;w i t he n t r y ,
we have J = k and the number of sellers adjusts. In Proposition 6 we show
that equilibrium without entry always exists and J is uniquely determined.
With entry, equilibrium exists assuming γ is not too high, and if it exists
equilibrium is generically unique. The existence result is similar to what we
found in previous models, but uniqueness here contrasts with the multiplicity
31found under bargaining and price taking. Intuitively, it reﬂects the fact that
market makers eﬀectively internalize any strategic complementarity between
money demand and entry.
Assuming the solution to (37) is unique, all open submarkets must have




z = g[q,1 − η(n)], (42)
where g is deﬁned in (17). Interestingly enough, (42) is the ﬁrst order
condition from the generalized Nash problem where the seller’s bargaining
power is η(n); hence, in competitive search equilibrium the terms of trade
endogenously satisfy the Hosios condition.
PROPOSITION 7: With either n =¯ n or free-entry, the optimal policy
is γ = β and it implies equilibrium is unique and eﬃcient.
PROOF: From (38), q = q∗ i fa n do n l yi fγ = β. From (35) and (42),
the free-entry condition is
α(n)
n
{g[q,1 − η(n)] − c(q)} = k. (43)
When q = q∗, (43) yields
α0(n)[u(q∗) − c(q∗)] = k, (44)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dg [q∗,1 − η(n)] − c(q∗)=η(n)[u(q∗) − c(q∗)] from (17).
Comparing (44) with (5), equilibrium is fully eﬃcient if and only if γ = β.
Q.E.D.
If n =¯ n then equilibrium is eﬃcient at the Friedman rule, basically
because there is no holdup problem. A close examination of (37) suggests
that competitive search equilibrium is equivalent to having buyers and sellers
32contract (commit to the terms of trade) before matching, which of course
gets around the holdup problem. Hence competitive and competitive search
equilibrium both yield eﬃciency along the intensive margin. When n is
endogenous, competitive search equilibrium does more, because the Hosios
condition arises endogenously; i.e. the extensive margin is also eﬃcient at
γ = β because market makers internalize the eﬀects of n on arrival rates.
6. CONCLUSION
We considered three diﬀerent market structures for monetary economies:
search equilibrium (bargaining), competitive equilibrium (price taking), and
competitive search equilibrium (price posting with directed search). We
found that eﬃciency and the eﬀects of policy depend crucially on the mar-
ket structure. Table 1 shows the eﬃciency properties of the diﬀerent models
at the Friedman rule. Regarding the intensive margin, γ = β implies q = q∗
in competitive equilibrium and competitive search equilibrium, but q<q ∗ in
search equilibrium if θ<1. Regarding the extensive margin, n is generically
ineﬃc i e n ti ns e a r c he q u i l i b r i u ma n dc o m p e titive equilibrium, because these
mechanisms do not generally internalize the eﬀects of entry; eﬃcient n re-
quires the Hosios condition. In competitive search equilibrium the relevant




Intensive margin q<q ∗ if θ<1 q = q∗ q = q∗
Extensive margin n ≷ n∗ n ≷ n∗ n = n∗
33Table 2 shows the welfare eﬀect of inﬂation for γ ≈ β.W i t hn exogenous,
inﬂation has only a second-order eﬀect in competitive and competitive search
equilibrium, due the envelope theorem: W is maximized and ∂W/∂γ =0
at γ = β. In the case of search equilibrium with θ<1,h o w e v e r ,t h e
envelope theorem does not apply: W is still maximized at γ = β, but
∂W/∂γ < 0 because we are at a corner solution (γ = β is the minimum
inﬂation rate consistent with equilibrium). Inﬂation has a ﬁrst order eﬀect in
this case. With n endogenous, inﬂation decreases W in search equilibrium,
but has an ambiguous eﬀect in competitive equilibrium; it is possible to
have ∂W/∂γ > 0. Finally, in competitive search equilibrium the envelope
theorem applies to both q and n when n is endogenous, and so inﬂation has




∂γ < 0 if θ<1 ∂W
∂γ ≈ 0 ∂W
∂γ ≈ 0
n endogenous ∂W
∂γ < 0 ∂W
∂γ ≷ 0 ∂W
∂γ ≈ 0
One can ask about the quantitative implications of the results. In Ro-
cheteau and Wright (2004) we numerically study the models analyzed here
by calibrating to standard data, and asking how much the welfare eﬀects of
inﬂation depend on the market structure.21 The ﬁndings are as follows. In
competitive search equilibrium our estimated welfare cost is very similar to
previous estimates, such as those in Lucas (2000): going from 10% to 0%
inﬂation is worth between 0.67% and 1.1% of consumption, depending on
details of the calibration. In search equilibrium, the estimated cost can be
21We actually work with a slightly diﬀerent framework in that paper, where instead
of assuming a ﬁxed number of buyers and free entry by sellers we let each agent choose
w h e t h e rt ob eab u y e ro ras e l l e r .
34between 3% and 5%, considerably bigger than what is found in most of the
literature. In competitive equilibrium, the cost is somewhere between the
other two models; while it is possible for positive inﬂation to be optimal this
was not the case at the calibrated parameter values. While by no means de-
ﬁnitive, we think these results are suggestive, and that it is worth pursuing
further quantitative work on these models.
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